A bibliographical review
The British do not write mudi military history because they do not like to be reminded that they have an army. Since the Second World War, British historians have been interested in the German army, but have ignored their own. As •Wheeler-Bennett, Craig, and Kitdien implied, it was proper for the Germans to have an army: Germany, according to Englishmen, was militaristic. Britain, as a naval power, was insular and peaceful; an assessment shared, so the British understand by Germans. Their assumption that standing armies meant despotism was not merely an example of British xenophobia. Throughout the 18th century the existence of the army theoretically depended upon the mutiny act of 1694, whidi provided the legal basis for military discipline, receiving the annual assent of parliament. Similarly, the principal theme of Western's study of the militia 2 was a constitutional one. The militia, volunteers officered by gentlemen, were restricted in their functions precisely in order to restrict the power of the executive. Suspicion of professional soldiers and suspicion of the power of the state have been powerful forces in British life since the reign of Charles I. The British, of course, had an army; certainly they employed large numbers of troops. What they did not usually have, in the period between the end of the American rebellion and the evacuation of the army of occupation from France, was either a strategy or a staff, or nothing a continental soldier would recognize as one. Of all soldiers, the British are most suspicious of the staff, and Mackesy demonstrated convincingly in his account of the American rebellion s , that in the 18th century grand strategy, like party politics, had only a tenuous existence: campaigns like governments were run by arrangement. This is not surprising. Britain's security depended upon her navy, her army, as Earl Cornwallis learned when besieged at Yorktown in 1781, upon command of the sea. Of the three authors who have written most convincingly about British strategy during this period, Mackesy 4 , Parkinson 6 , and Rodger two are primarily naval historians. Their work is better precisely because they were aware, both of the limits of sea power, and that the need to make the services co-operate was the greatest obstacle to an efficient high command.
The most influential statement ever made about British strategy was Jonathan Swift's pamphlet »Upon the Conduct of the allies« 7 . Written towards the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, by the end of the 18th century its arguments had become revealed truth. Swift implied that in any continental question that interested Britain, some continental state must be found, more interested and on the same side. In consequence, whenever the British had to go to war, their continental ally would fight as the principal, diverting the attention of the enemy, while the British themselves, supplying only such assistance as was necessary to prevent their ally's defeat, fought for command of the sea and to capture the enemy colonies. When these conditions, a powerful ally and command of the sea, were satisfied -during the Seven Years' War -the British were victorious: when they were not -during the American rebellion -they were defeated. For most of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, one condition was satisfied while the other was not. Rodger and Mackesy reveal that between the Duke of York's failure in the Netherlands in 1794 and Wellington's success in the Peninsula, the British wasted valuable time and effort in arguing about where and for what purpose they should send their army 8 . Their choice was restricted, because they were unable to obtain either an ally or a coalition sufficiently interested or sufficiently persistent to sustain the war against the French. Despite Rodger's criticism, Ziegler's defence of Addington's negotiations for the peace of Amiens is sound Pitt had proved that he could neither wage war nor negotiate peace. The second coalition had collapsed, and the war, which had cost the British a large increase in the cost of living and the public debt, was at a stalemate. This did not mean that both Britain and France had been equally successful: captured West Indian islands were not the equivalent of conquered European states. The principal strategic reassessment required of the British during this period was to find a way to influence the balance of power in Europe, once the rise of Prussia and Russia and the decline of Spain and Holland had shifted its focus to the east. Like Prussia and Russia, revolutionary France, unlike Bourbon France, could not be defeated at sea, because the revolutionaries would not admit that colonies mattered.
Between 1794 and 1807, the British government, continuing in the tradition begun by Swift, disagreed about three questions of strategy 10 . Helleiner and Sherwig have chronicled the British resistance to their allies' demands for ever increasing subsidies to pay for fighting France u . The most interesting aspect of their account was the strategic role assigned by the British to Austria. The British were far less willing to subsidize Austria than Prussia; partly because Prussia was expected to be more interested than Austria in the area of greatest interest to the British, Holland and the Netherlands, partly because they expected Austria to fight whether subsidized or not. If Austria had been strong enough to do what the British expected, France would not have been the menace she was 12 . Secondly, the British argued about whether or not they should send their army to fight alongside the allied armies, or should use it independently, either in defence of particular British interests, or in diversionary raids upon the coasts of France and Spain. The British had originally planned a third role, supporting a counter-revolution, but, as Mitdiell explained 13 , they abandoned this during the Directory in favour of suborning the opposition in the legislature. Those who wanted the British army sent to fight alongside the allies, usually in Italy, did not expect it to strengthen the allied army in the field, but rather the allied government's will to fight 14 . Its role was less military than diplomatic. The alternative argument was stated by Addington; that it was preferable to demoralize the French army by making it await an opportunity to invade England. Once the invasion had been repulsed, the continental states might re-enter the war with better prospects of victory 15 .
Rodger followed in the tradition of Sir John Fortescue by condemning these British habits of independence. Mackesy was more sympathetic. Any alliance capable of defeating the French would depend upon British subsidies. While the British, appearing to ignore the principal reason for Napoleon's success, scattered their army, doing so enabled them to concentrate their fleet at the decisive point of battle. The British equivalent to Austerlitz was Trafalgar. Sir James Craig's fruitless landing in Naples in 1806 caught Napoleon's attention far more than might have been expected; more important it secured for the British a naval base in Sicily 16 . Access to Sicily was vital for the British Mediterranean fleet. Malta could not feed the fleet: it needed to be fed. The British army was legitimately employed in defending vital naval bases. It was equally legitimately employed, as Parkinson explained in his account of the projected expeditions against Manila and Batavia 17 , in protecting or expanding the markets upon whidi the prosperity of Britain depended. If Britain's principal contribution to defeating France was to be subsidies, the British were right to use their army as an aid to obtaining command of the sea and an expanding overseas trade. The British armies overseas did not necessarily detract from the potential military strength of any alliance. These uses may have been legitimate, but nobody has defended the British habit of raiding unsuccessfully the coasts of France and Spain. The expedition to Bellisle in 1800 -similarly the expedition to Egypt in 1807 -neither diverted the Frendi nor strengthened the allies or the navy 18 . The French, in contrast, succeeded in diverting the British. The third strategic question debated by the British, the result of the Frendi invasion of Egypt, was how mudi attention should be paid to the defence of British India. Odiakov incident 19 , the British interest in the Near East had been continental: as in the Crimean War, the expansion of Russia should be restricted in the interests of the balance of power. As the Baltic froze for part of the year, the Black Sea was the only place where the British, in theory, might bring to bear their sea power. The French invasion of Egypt introduced a new imperial priority into Britain's interest in the Near East. The effect of this, as Parkinson demonstrated, was to preserve Manila and Batavia from attack for ten years, in consequence exposing the China convoys, financially valuable to the British economy, to repeated hazard 20 .
The British were alarmed in India at the prospect, both of a European invasion overland 21 , and of coalitions of native states organized by French agents 22 . This alarm was exploited by at least one governor-general as a disguise for his policy of territorial expansion 23 . The alarm was not unwarranted. The British did not fear that they could not defeat an invader, but that the prospect of invasion would incite their Indian subjects to rebel. Fighting a civil war simultaneously with a foreign war would be costly. As a result, the British strategy for the defence of British India resembled their strategy in Europe; to attempt to persuade the near eastern states to defend their empire for them 24 . Their reasons for adopting sudi a strategy were also similar. The British wished to protect their particular interests without being entangled in the local balance of power. Their military strategy reflected their political calculation, that Britain, as an insular and naval power, prospered best when there could be assumed to be a balance of power. Despite this attempt to limit their responsibilities, it must not be forgotten that throughout the Napoleonic Wars the British had in India a much larger army than they had in England, and that there were sometimes more English regiments stationed there than were available for service on the continent 25 . From 1798 onwards, British strategy was polarized between the often conflicting needs of London and Calcutta.
While the Frendi succeeded during the first half of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in diverting the British, the British eventually discovered in the Peninsula a means of successfully diverting the Frendi. The reasons for their success were political rather than strategic, although the area was well suited to supplying and reinforcing an army from the sea, and the British could rely upon being supported by the natives, who had failed them in France and Holland. 18 The British Government unsuccessfully demanded that Catherine II should not annexe Odiakov, at the mouth of the Southern Bug, principally because they feared that it would prevent Britain from increasing her trade with Poland. 34 . This proves what the Whigs had always sought to hide, that George III was a shrewd judge of men and strategy, who realized mudi sooner than his ministers that expeditions to the East and West Indies would have no effect on France, but would, instead, kill off the British army, The King's predictions in 1800 of disaster in Egypt proved unfounded, but given the previous record there was no reason to expect them to. Once the organization of the high command of the British army is understood, what is surprising is not that the British fought so ineffectively during most of this period, but that they were able to fight at all. Fortunately, although there are few books written exclusively about the army, just as there are three excellent books on British strategy, there are two equivalent ones on the high command. Ward's account of Wellington's headquarters 35 provides in its first chapter a concise account of the growth of the different departments of the army. The complexities of these departments, and how they conflicted rather than cooperated with one another, at least until Castlereagh took over the war department, are detailed in Glover's account of the reform of training, promotion, and discipline, between 1795 and 1809, indispensable reading for any historian of the period 3e . Sometimes, although not for the first ten years of this period, the British army had a commander-in-chief. The attraction for politicians of managing without one was that they might then make use of his patronage, particularly the prospect of promotion, for political purposes. The commander-in-chief was not anyway what he appeared. His authority was shared with three other officials, all of whom during the war of the second coalition, for example, sat in the cabinet. These three were the secretary of state for war (and the colonies after 1803), an office created in 1794, who had the strategic direction of the army; the secretary at war, who administered the army and supervised its expenses (accounting for them to parliament); and the master-general of the ordnance, a high-ranking soldier, who was responsible for armament and supply (except clothing, the responsibility of a civilian commissary general), and was also the independent commander-in-chief of the artillery and engineers. The dangers to the historian from this proliferation are considerable. Fortescue, who criticized Oman for failing to examine properly the organization of the British army, sometimes forgot himself how it was organized. In criticizing Henry Dundas, secretary for war 1794-1801, for sending British expeditions overseas inadequately armed, Fortescue forgot that Dundas's responsibility was only to decide where the army should go. The Duke of Richmond, master-general 1784-1795, was responsible for arming it. The proliferation also affected adversely the behaviour of officers in the field. Officers on the staff, or in the artillery and engineers, often felt responsible, not to the commander to whom they were attached, but to either the commander-in-chief or the master-general in London. This system became less disorganized after Castlereagh became secretary of state for war in 1805 (everyone agrees that he was excellent), and the Duke of York, commander-in-chief 1798-1809, 1811-1827, after 1803 consolidated his position, eclipsing between them both the secretary at war and the master-general of the ordnance. York, despite the efforts of Burne to prove the opposite 37 , was not a good commander in the field, but he proved a good administrator. The reasons for his appointments were political; only a prince of the blood could expect automatically to command over allied troops, and also possess the moral authority necessary to overcome indiscipline and jobbery. York's career contrasted strongly with the career of Richmond at the ordnance office, who was an equally good administrator but an equally bad politician. Olson's short biography, followed by a selection of letters 3e , reveals clearly how poorly Richmond was supported both by Pitt and George III. He left his office humming with invention, but, as it was to remain, dironically short of men: Wellington had poor success at sieges as a result. For the researcher, the most useful recent book on the ordnance is the catalogue compiled by Colonel Laws 39 . This lists all the units of the artillery, their commanders, and their change of station Both in peace and war.
The efficiency of the British army was further impaired both by the system of promotion and by the organization of the staff. The principal staff officers under the orders of the commander-in-chief were the adjutant-general and the quartermaster-general. In the 18th century their importance was not what a continental soldier might expect. The adjutant-general, the more powerful, was responsible for seeing that all orders issued by the commander-in-chief were carried out, even those issued through the quartermaster-general. While the army was scattered around the country in small detachments the quartermaster-general had nothing to do but to specify the routes they should use if they moved. The incompetence of the staff contributed to the disaster in Flanders in 1793 and 1794. Partly as a result, by the end of the war their performance had been transformed into the model of a general staff, to whidi continental armies looked for guidance 40 . The British, as usual, promptly discarded what they had created, and in the Crimean War had to start afresh. The system of promotion appeared equally idiosyncratic. The ordnance promoted solely by seniority: elsewhere in the army an officer might be promoted by purchase, by brevet, to succeed to a vacancy, or (and most iniquitous) by recruiting. Granting commissions as a reward for recruiting was one of the devices adopted by a government that had, as Western implies, to disregard the militia when calculating the number of troops it had available. Purchase, on the other hand, was defended by Glover 41 as tending during this period to give high command to men who were young and vigorous enough to exercise it. While it is possible to over-emphasize the tendency of this system to favour the upper classes (Wellington would have preferred his officers to be more aristocratic), British officers were expected increasingly to behave according to the increasingly rigorous codes of the gentleman. As Barnett phrases it, Squire Weston had been superseded by Mr. Darcy 42 .
The effects both of the proliferation of command and of the gentlemanly pretentions of officers were seen in the conduct of expeditions overseas. It was difficult to persuade anybody to serve under Wellington, because he was so junior in his rank. It was even more difficult to persuade either generals or admirals to serve under one another. British combined operations frequently failed solely because the British would not -or could not -appoint supreme commanders. The expedition to Ferrol in 1800 was the best example 4S , the co-operation between Keith and Abercromby in Egypt in 1801 was the best exception. The British were equally incapable of persuading both their soldiers and sailors to co-operate with their diplomatists. Mackesy explains how Collingwood resented the demands of the ambassador in Constantinople, that he should send a squadron into the Black Sea in 1809, to divert the Russians from joining the French against Austria 44 . Parkinson relates a similar collision between the flag officer in command, East Indies, and the governor-general 45 . In 1800 there were three naval, one military, and two diplomatic officers, all with independent responsibilities in the eastern Mediterranean. The result was a classic diplomatic imbroglio, the convention of el-Arish 4e .
Despite the confused system in which they worked, one or two British generals fought better than their countrymen had any right to expect. Books on Wellington, although legion, are notoriously unreliable. The most recent are no exception. Davies, tedious as ever, nevertheless provided a useful account of the private and personal features of Wellington's army 47 ; but except for the quotations from the family papers, Lady Longford's book is a great disappointment 48 . The less said of it the better. Lady Longford's next volume will presumably recount Wellington's political career; but there is already a useful survey, both of Wellington's co-operation with Castlereagh and of his influence after the war, in Bartlett 49 . In addition, Brett-James has written a useful book on Graham 60 , and Miss Oman, who is unusually able at combining scholarship with entertainment, and whose books are much more thoroughly researched than they appear, a more interesting one on Sir John Moore 51 . The outstanding work on any general, and an example that books about ancestors need not be disappointing, is the Marquess of Anglesey's book about the Earl of Uxbridge, who commanded the cavalry at Waterloo 52 . Uxbridge's reputation was built upon his bold and skillful screening of Moore's retreat to Coruna. His character is what fascinates the reader. His pursuit of women, war, and politics was characterized by a Regency vigour and ruthlessness, and an enviable disregard for the opinions of others. Uxbridge, not Wellington, provides a good example of why the English aristocracy retained for so long their social and political prominence. The closest resemblance to an officer corps in the British army was to be found in India, in the officers of the Indian Army. These men went out to India to make their fortunes, principally from allowances, of which some good examples are supplied by Calahan 53 and Lady Longford; and were determined to prevent any reforms that might curtail their allowances and introduce promotion by merit or connexion, instead of, as in the ordnance, solely by seniority. To protect this system, and the benefits they accrued from it, the officers, as Philips 54 and Ehrman 55 demonstrated, acted powerfully and effectively as a lobby in English politics. This behaviour should not be a surprise. In Europe the British were primarily a naval power; if they had to humour anybody it was the navy. Their attitude towards the navy revealed the British as being as militaristic as anybody. In India, however, where the British depended upon their army for their existence, they had, like any other continental state, to consider questions of strategy, and to organize an effective high command. It is unfortunate that in their aversion for military history the British have recently ignored the history of their Indian army. Military history, even more than diplomatic, has gone out of fashion with the empire.
